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Abstract 
 
This article presents an evaluation approach for alternative electronic market designs and examines the impact of 
introducing an IT-enabled innovation (a social communication tool to support group coordination) in an online 
group-buying market in terms of group decision-making and economic performance. Drawing on theory from 
economics, decision theory, and information systems, we present a competitive arousal model for a social buying 
setting that posits that introducing competitive arousal among buyers reduces buyer profits and that social 
facilitation can mitigate these costs through better task completion and time to completion rates. Using an 
economic experiment, we found that rivalry has a negative effect on buyer profits but also that pressure increases 
the efficiency of social communication in terms of group formation. We discuss the implications of these results.  
 
Keywords: Online market design, experimental economics, competitive arousal, electronic group buying, IT-
enabled group coordination.  
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our research presents an evaluation of a specific IT-enabled market mechanism for electronic group-buying 
platform. We argue that experimental economics offers a useful approach to systematically design and evaluate 
new electronic market mechanisms and technology features that is applicable for a large range of research 
problems. This research explores specifically the impact of competitive pressure and social communication on 
group buying performance in terms of buyer profits and task completion time. We conducted experiments in the 
laboratory using a variation of the buyer-initiated intra-auction group buying model (Chen et al, 2009). The basic 
experimental environment was the same as the one used in Pelaez (2012). 
Social buying platforms may facilitate social communication that help buyers set up groups and coordinate group 
decision tasks (negotiating a common offer among the group members with an agreed upon price and submitting 
it to the seller). Group buying is different from individual buying in standard business-to-consumer electronic 
commerce. First, buyers organize into groups to aggregate demand and thus leverage increased bargaining power 
to obtain price discounts from the seller. Second, group buying sites could offer features that facilitate social 
interactions among buyers. Using an electronic group buying setting is interesting for theoretical reasons, too. 
First, buyers no longer act independently as they need to coordinate with others in order to get together a joint 
offer for a deal with a seller. This creates bid interdependency group auctions. Second, social buying platforms 
may adopt tools to facilitate social interaction among buyers at different levels, which could affect group 
coordination and performance. The literature on individual auctions generally finds that competitive pressure 
leads to overbidding and profit loss and that more social interaction can increase competitive motivation. 
However, we should also point out that the platform owners need to be aware that offering too much social 
facilitation (and communication support for the buyers) could enable buyer collusion and present a risk to sellers, 
and in that case sellers could simply decide to defect and leave the platform. We present a model for decision-
making under competitive pressure on a group-buying platform that is based on Ku et al (2005). However, we 
offer two critical extensions to Ku’s model. We extend the decision-making problem from an individual to a 
group setting and we introduce an online communication channel as a social communication feature. Our 
experiment replicated the established finding from the auction literature that inducing competition (by introducing 
rivalry among buyers) lowers buyer profits. But more importantly, we also tested for effects of social 
communication on task completion rate and the time to completion. Interestingly, and consistent with Ku et al. 
(2005) and Malhotra (2010) social communication actually reduced the efficiency of decision-making. 
Importantly, though, we show that there are also significant interaction effects between competitive pressure and 
social communication that offset some of costs from competition with more efficient group coordination in terms 
of task completion rate and time to completion when buyers are competitively motivated. Our study contributes to 
the auction and e-commerce literatures. We show that while buyers under competitive pressure develop bidding 
behaviors that violate predictions of rational choice theory, buyers also obtain some benefits when they act as a 
cohesive group with communication capabilities.  
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We borrow from two streams of research to theoretically ground our study and develop specific hypotheses. For 
one, we use economics to theorize the relationship between buyer group size and surplus generated in the market. 
Second, we borrow from the decision making theory in psychology to theorize the effects of competitive arousal 
and use information systems work to theorize the effect of communication capability on group performance in 
terms of buyer profits, task completion, and time to completion. Research on competitive interaction has shown 
that time pressure is a critical driver for competitive arousal as it increases the need to make quick decisions and 
decreases the consideration of the consequences (Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990). Therefore, all the 
hypotheses we develop below assume the presence of time pressure. 
 
 
2.1 Impact on task completion rate 
There is a long tradition in economics in studying competitive behavior, the competition for limited and contested 
resources. Generally, competition increases efficiency in market settings (Hirshleifer, 1978) Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
 H1: Increasing competitive pressure in buyers in a group-buyer model will tend to reduce the failure rate for 
task completion.   
2.2 Impact on buyer profits 
While rational choice theory generally views competitive behavior as advantageous to the individual regarding the 
achievement of goals, behavioral research argues that competitively motivated individuals tend to abandon 
rationally determined (optimal) decision rules when emotional factors (like competitive feelings) are present, and 
this holds especially under time pressure when quick judgments and decisions need to be made and when 
outcomes depend on others’ decisions as well. In those circumstances competitive behaviour can have negative 
consequences for the individual (Garcia et al, 2006; Guth et al, 1982). The desire to win can overpower original 
goals, which could have been based on utility maximization, and individuals may pay more than they initially 
planned and accept losses just to beat the opponents (Cox et al, 1992; Malhorta et al, 2008; Jones, 2011). Hence 
we theoretically predict the following.  
 H2: Increasing competitive pressure in buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits.  
 H3: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits more strongly in buyer groups 
with more peer buyers.  
Recent research in social commerce also suggests that the social embeddedness of market transactions, like 
facilitating social interactions on a market platform, can mitigate the effects of competitive pressure (Malhorta 
2010; Takac et al, 2011).  
 H4: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits less strongly in buyer groups 
that have access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages.  
Pelaez et al. (2012) found that communication in group settings is most effective in smaller groups. In large 
groups cognitive demands on information processing can offset the benefits of having access to more information. 
Hence we propose the following.  
 H5: Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages will save 
more profits in buyer groups with a smaller number of co-actors. 
2.3 Impact on time to task completion 
Researcher indicates that when people feel competitively pressured they tend to shift from focusing on original 
goals (e.g. profit maximization) to others like winning an auction and getting what they wanted in the first place. 
This effect is known as reversal of preferences, which can lead to a more aggressive pursuit of secondary goals 
(Bazerman et al, 1992). Hence we propose:  
 H6: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to accelerate time to task completion.  
However, Pelaez et al. (2012) found that offering more communication capabilities may distract users as they 
spend more time on exchanging messages, which can decrease the time to completing the set task. Their study 
also indicates that group size negatively affects group coordination. Thus, we predict the following two 
hypotheses.  
 H7: Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages will tend to 
decelarate the time to task completion.  
 H8: Increasing the number of peer buyers in groups will tend to decelerate the time to task completion.  
 
 
Increasing social presence and facilitating more social interaction can heighten the effects of competitive pressure 
and increase dominant responses and improve task performance (Ku et al, 2005; Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Bigger 
social groups, exhibit this effect more strongly than smaller ones (Guerin, 1986). Hence, we posit the following.  
 H9: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to speed up the time to completion more strongly in 
buyer groups with a higher number of co-actors.  
Increasing communication capacity should allow buyers to share more information and should help them 
coordinate better with the peer members of their buyer group in comparison to groups without such a 
communication mechanism (Dennis et al, 2008). Enhanced communication should make it easier for groups to 
form and easier for them to complete their tasks. When individuals are competitively motivated and rely on others 
for achieving the desired outcome, more information and increased communication should result in more efficient 
group formation (Rusbult & van Lange, 2002). Thus, we expect that relationships form more readily in the 
presence of an additional communication channel. 
 H10: Increasing competitive arousal in buyers will tend to accelerate the time to completion more strongly in 
buyer groups that have access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages.  
Finally, Chen et al. (2009) have shown that technology provides effective communication in intra-auction bidding 
clubs but coordination becomes more difficult as the member base increases. Hence, we similarly theorize the 
following.  
 H11: Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private messages will slow 
down the time to task completion more strongly in buyer groups with a higher number of co-actors. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Experimental design 
We designed an economic experiment that created an electronic market in the laboratory where human subjects 
were asked to organize group purchases of a single product offered by a monopolistic seller. We adopted the basic 
experimental environment as discussed in Pelaez (2012).  Each individual group buyer gets a private, pre-assigned 
value for the product. Consumer valuations, which define how much a product is worth to a buyer and thus how 
much they are willing to pay for it, vary across buyers. Each buyer needs to buy exactly one unit of the product. 
The subjects were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and were compensated with course credit. 
For the purpose of our specific study, we also had to make some important modifications and additions to the 
basic design which we describe next. 
We used a 2×2×2 design in which we manipulated three variables at two levels, competitive pressure, group size 
(number of peer buyers), and social communication (presence of communication channel). In addition to 
competitive pressure, we further induced time pressure by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-half minutes each. 
This was held constant across all treatments. The specific time limit was determined after several rounds of pilot 
runs. This time window was sufficient for groups to complete their given tasks but short enough to make them 
feel that they needed to make decision quickly.  
Competitive pressure (CP) was induced by creating rivalry. In one treatment (CP=no) a single group was present 
to negotiate bids with the seller. In another (CP=yes) two rival groups were created. Buyers could either place an 
opening bid (proposed purchasing price offered to the seller) or join an existing bid within the group. With 
competition, only the buyers who are willing and quick enough to join a common offer with an agreed bid price 
have the chance to become the actual buyers (if the bid is successful). For the groups without the competition, all 
buyers are in the same group, and therefore, there is no competition from a rival group.  
Group size was represented by the number of peer buyers (GS) and social communication was introduced as a   
communication channel (CC). First, we compared the presence of a small number of peer buyers  (GS=2) with the 
a larger number (GS=4). In other words, in the former treatment the buyer groups were of size two, and in the 
 
 
latter groups were of size four. Our operationalization of large and small groups is similar to those in prior 
research [5, 21].  
The third manipulation compared low with high communication capacity among buyers. At the high level 
(CC=yes) we included a communication channel as a feature on the buyer screen while no such communication 
channel was offered at the low level (CC=no). We implemented the communication channel with a standard 
communication box, similar to an Internet chat box, where buyers could post and receive private messages from 
their fellow group members.  
3.2 Procedure 
Each session consisted of groups with 1 seller and 2, 4 or 8 potential buyers. When coming to the lab, the subjects 
were randomly assigned to computer terminals with a seller screen for the seller and a buyer screen for the buyers.  
Once the participants were seated, they were asked to review a set of instructions [see Appendices 7.1 and 7.2] 
that provided information about the group buying mechanism and their assigned roles and tasks. Each session 
consisted of a practice period followed by ten additional periods, where buyers worked to organize group offers 
with the seller through bidding. Each round lasted two and a half minutes.  
The buyer and seller tasks were similar in all eight treatments, except for the following important differences. In 
the treatments with communication channel buyers could use a chat box to exchange private messages, which was 
not available in treatments without the communication channel. The manipulation of group size changes the 
number of other buyers required for a group, but it did not affect the interface of the buyer screens or their 
principle tasks. In treatments without competition, participants were assigned to a group before the round. In 
treatments with competition rival groups were created dynamically and buyers could join and switch groups 
depending on currently posted bids.  
Buyers could increase their joint offer or join a different offer if their bid was not accepted. The buyer screen was 
more complex. First, it showed them the assigned valuation of the product. Each buyer had a unique, private 
product valuation that was randomly selected from a uniform distribution (25,100). To reduce the potential for 
learning effects, the product valuation values were rotated every period. Bids could only be changed in one dollar 
increments. Once bids were placed, the other buyers could "join" the bid if the bid price was below their product 
value, thus preventing overbidding. Once the requisite number of buyers joined, group formation occurred and the 
bid would be submitted to the seller (task completion).  
In the treatments with competition, buyers could join any bid, thus allowing for dynamically forming groups.  
E.g., a buyer could choose a bid for 25, but then decide to join another offer at 23, created by a different group of 
participants. By allowing buyers to join different offers, we establish competition and rivalry between buyers. The 
interface only tells the buyer the number of buyers in the group but it doesn't indicate who the other buyers are. In 
the treatment with a private communication channel buyers were able to exchange messages via an instant 
message type of communication box. There were no limitations on the kind of information buyers could 
exchange. 
The tasks and interface for the seller remained basically unchanged across treatments. The seller only saw the bids 
once a group formed and made a joint offer. The seller’s screen showed the bid price, the number of people who 
joined in the bid and the total amount of the offer. The seller then had the opportunity to accept the bid, 
terminating the current session, or to do nothing and leave the bid active, thus allowing time for other bids to 
form. Sellers only saw the highest bid that meets the requisite number of buyers, therefore, only one bid at a time 
was visible to the sellers at any given time in the experiment.  
When a transaction occurred, that is, when a seller accepted an offer from the buyer group, both the seller’s profit 
and buyer’s profit were calculated and shown to the participants. Buyer profits (buyer surplus) were computed for 
each buyer as product valuation minus transaction price, that is, the difference between the worth of the product to 
the buyer and what she paid for it. No profits were earned by anyone when a round ended with no bids being 
accepted. The cumulative profit over all ten periods was used to compare how each buyer performed in the 
experiment. 
 
 
3.3 Experimental variables 
In Table 1, we summarize our independent, dependent, and control variables that we modeled for our experiment. 
 
 
IV 
Competitive  Pressure  
(CP = no, yes); 
Communication Capacity    
(CC = no, yes) 
Group Size 
(GS = 2 or 4) 
DV 
Buyer Profit  
task completion rate 
(completing purchase ) 
time to task completion 
CV 
Experimental Periods  
(P1,  P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1) 
Table 1. Experimental variables 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive analysis  
The experiment was done out with 77 groups. A group included one seller and, depending on the treatment, two, 
four or eight potential buyers. Data were collected from each group over 10 repeated rounds of group buying, for 
a total of 770 rounds of bidding. The experiment represents a 2x2x2 design with repeated measures.  
Out of the 770 rounds, task completion occurred in 573. Those bids were successful and accepted by a seller, 
yielding a 74.5% success rate. Table 2 shows the number of successful bids and the groups that generated them. 
Manipulating the three treatment variables competitive pressure (CP), group size (GS), and presence of 
communication channel (CC) at two levels each yields a total of eight treatments.  
 
 
#bids (#groups) 
Communication 
Channel 
CC=yes  CC=no  
CP=no 
GS=2 85 (11) 94 (13) 
GS=4 75 (12) 42 (8) 
CP=yes 
GS=2 69 (8) 68 (8) 
GS=4 70 (8) 70 (8) 
Table 2. Successful task completion 
We offer a summary of our descriptive analysis regarding the group bidding activities and outcomes in table 3. 
We removed the rounds that ended without producing a joint group bid from the correlation analysis because for 
unsuccessful group biddings task completion could not occur and hence time to completion could not be 
measured. We then conducted a nonparametric Spearman’s rho correlation analysis (which is summarized in table 
4) to investigate the correlations between the three main treatments and the two dependent variables, buyer profit 
and time to task completion (successful group offer coordinated and submitted to seller). The correlation analysis 
shows that competitive pressure is positively correlated with both buyer profit and the time for task completion, 
and both correlations are significant at the 0.01 level. The group size is positively correlated with the time for task 
completion, and the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
 
 
 
    # 
Bid 
Buyer 
Profit 
Time to  
Completion 
    Mean SD Mean SD 
CP 
no 296 43.1 13.5 23.2 22.7 
yes 277 36.7 12.9 9.4 5.5 
CC 
No 299 40.1 14.1 15.2 14.4 
Yes 274 39.9 12.9 18.0 21.5 
ACT 
Small 316 40.6 15.2 14.3 14.2 
Large 257 39.3 11.2 19.3 21.7 
Grand Total 573 40.0 13.6 16.5 18.1 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Profit Time Period CPT CM 
Profit      
Time -.084*     
Period -.061 -.210**    
CPT -.231** -.504** -.033   
CM -.009 .056 .018 .039  
GS -.046 .104* .032 .111** -.077 
Table 4. Correlations  
 
4.2 Hypothesis testing 
4.2.1 Main test 1—Logistic regression.  
When rival groups were created, increasing competitive arousal, the failure rate, p, for successfully completing 
the task of making a joint group offer significantly decreased from 0.342 when competitive pressure was low to 
0.134 when it was high. The odds ratio of competition arousal (0 /1) is 0.298.  
 Odds ratio = [ p0/(1- p0)]/[ p1/(1- p1)] 
A simple logistic regression test shows that introducing competition pressure can significantly reduce the failure 
rate for completing the task (table 5). This supports H1. 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
Odds 
Ratio 
CA -1.19 .19 37.82 1 .00 .30 
α 1.86 .16 129.16 1 .00 6.44 
pseudo R-squares: 
Cox & Snell R Square=0.056 
Nagelkerke R Square=0.082 
Table 5. Logistic regression 
The unsuccessful bidding attempts were excluded from the remaining analysis, yielding an unequal sample size 
for our 2×2×2 design with repeated measures. To control the effect of repeated measures for the unequal sample 
size, we applied two sets of statistical examinations, a multiple linear regressions as the main test, followed by a 
mixed model analysis with maximum likelihood estimation as a robustness test.  
4.2.2 Main test 2—multiple linear regression.  
We used dummy coding to convert the categorical variables competitive pressure (CP), group size (GS) and 
communication capacity (CC) into dichotomous variables. More specifically, for the treatment with smaller group 
size GS was coded as “0”, and for the larger group treatments (group size of four) GS=“1”. Similarly, for the 
treatment without the availability of a communication channel CC was coded as “0”, and with communication 
channel CC=“1”; and for the treatment without competitive pressure, CP was coded as “0”, and with competitive 
pressure, CP was “1”.  Additional dummy variables were generated to indicate the experimental periods. Two 
 
 
different regression tests were conducted separately to analyze the proposed hypotheses about the two dependent 
variables (buyer) profit and on time (for task completion).  
We show the results of the two separate test combined, in table 6. We did one test for buyer profits, aggregated 
across buyers and rounds, and another for time for task completion. In order to examine the contribution of main 
effects and interaction effects, we applied a hierarchical multiple linear regression in three stages (indicated as 
models 1, 2, and 3). We aslo added the control variable to account for possible effects from the experimental 
periods. Again, the main effects were from competition, communication, and group size, and we considered 
additionally three two-way interaction effects.  The 9 dummy variables, P1 through P9 are included in the test in 
order to control the effect of repeated measurement (round effects). The coefficients of P1 through P9 indicate the 
differences in profit or time between a specific period and the remaining reference period 10. By statistically 
controlling for the effects of repeated measures, we obtain more valid results regarding the treatment effects in the 
experiment.  
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Profit Time Profit Time Profit Time 
α 34.9** 15.3** 38.4** 17.6** 39.9** 13.9** 
P1 .4 10.5** .1 10.6** -.0 11.2** 
P2 7.0** 1.7 7.0** 2.4 7.0** 3.2 
P3 9.2** 3.2 9.2** 3.7 9.1** 4.6 
P4 4.2† -.8 4.3† -.1 4.3† .5 
P5 4.3† -.3 3.9† -.5 3.7 .2 
P6 11.4** .1 10.9** -.5 10.9** -.5 
P7 12.1** .7 11.6** .1 11.7** .3 
P8 3.2 -1.9 2.8 -2.7 2.7 -2.2 
P9 -.7 -2.1 -1.3 -3.1 -1.3 -2.4 
CP   -6.3** -15.0** -9.9** -5.0* 
CC   -.1 4.1** -2.8† 6.0** 
GS   -.4 7.1** -.1 10.8** 
CP*CC     7.3** -9.3** 
CP*ACT     .6 -13.3** 
CC*GS     -2.1 7.2** 
∆R2-Profit .111  .055  .017  
∆R2-Time  .038  .196  .049 
Table 6. Multiple linear regression with Unstandardized coefficients. 
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). *. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 **. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.2.3 Buyer profit (H2 – H5).  
Regarding buyer profit, the only significant main effect is from the competition mechanism, which manipulated 
competitive pressure. The only significant two-way interaction effect is contributed by competition mechanism 
and communication. The results in “Model 2” show that the buyer profit of the groups with competitive pressure 
is $6.3 less than the buyer profit of the groups without it, which is significant at the 0.01 level, and which 
 
 
contributes 5.5% of explanatory power. In other words, introducing competitive pressure among buyers reduces 
buyer profits, benefiting the seller. This result supports H2.  
The results in “Model 3” show that the interaction of competition and communication are positively related to 
group profit (at 0.01 level), contributing 1.7% of explanatory power. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction effects of 
competition and communication on group profit. Introducing competition, we observed the expected profit loss, 
but we also found that making a communication channel available to buyers plays a positive role in mitigating the 
profit loss that results from the competitive pressure. This supports H4. Our hypotheses H3 and H5, on the other 
hand, were not supported.   
 
 
Figure 1. Interaction effects of competition and communication on buyer profit 
4.2.4  Time to Task Completion (H6 – H11)  
With regard to time for task completion, all three proposed main effects are significant, supporting H6-H8. 
According to the results in Model 2, competitive pressure reduces the time to task completion, making a group 
purchase, making it about 15 seconds faster (significant at the 0.01 level). Making a communication channel 
available to buyers slows the time for task competion down by about 4 seconds while increasing the size of the 
group slows it down by about 7 seconds (both effects are significant at the 0.01 level). The three main effects 
together contribute 19.6% of predictive power.  
The two-way interaction effects of competition and communication and those of competition and group size are 
negatively significant at the 0.01 level. The interaction effects of communication level and group size are 
significantly positive at the 0.01 level. These two-way-interaction effects together contribute 4.9% of explanatory 
power. These results support hypotheses H9 to H11. 
Our results indicate that competition can reduce the time for task completion and that offering communication 
channels can significantly enhance this effect. The interaction effects of competitive pressure and group size 
indicate that competitive motivation helps groups with peer buyers to become more efficient than groups with 
fewer (figure 3). The interaction effects of communication level and group size indicates that the two treatments 
could reinforce each other in slowing down the time for task completion.  
Finally, we also report that the three-way interaction, CP*GS*CC, was also statistically significant, but because of 
the general complexity of three-way interactions we refrain from attempting to offer a theoretical explanation for 
the effect in this paper.  
4.2.5 Robustness tests.  
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To check the robustness of the main tests, we also conducted a mixed model analysis on the two dependent 
variables. The test results for the two dependent variables, were highly consistent with the results of the main test. 
 
5. ROLE OF THE SOCIAL COMMUNICAITON CHANNEL  
To put the role of communication channels under closer scrutiny, we performed some additional analysis, through 
which we will find out who the most motivated users of the information sharing tools were, and how different 
types of information sharing affect group performance differently.  
We had a total of 370 bidding rounds with a communication box, among which only 299 rounds successfully 
made a transaction. Among these 370 rounds, only in 208 rounds did the buyers choose to use the communication 
channels. These buyers posted a total of 1606 messages, while the others did not post any messages. To count the 
average message posted differentiated by level of willingness-to-pay (WTP), successfulness, and competition, we 
plotted the column chart, shown as figure 5. It suggests, first, that posting messages does not guarantee the 
success of bidding, and in fact in failed rounds buyers tend to post more messages on average. Second, under 
competitive pressure, buyers tend to post less than the buyers without competitive pressure. And third, the groups 
with low WTP tend to post more messages than those with higher WTP values.  
The high failure rate for the group sharing more messages suggests that inappropriate usage of communication 
tool will result in substantial information overload, which might compromise the ongoing bidding process. The 
fact that the groups under competition tend to share less information among group members might imply that 
competition created the tension among buyers and induced the lower level of trust within group. Consequently, 
buyers in a group without enough trust tend to share less information than in the group with high trust. For the 
groups with different levels of WTP, we conjecture that low WTP will induce higher level of perceived 
uncertainty of the group buying market, which in turn will motivate buyers to search and share information in order to 
reduce the uncertainty and make better decision.  
 
Figure 5. Message Data Summary. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has a number of limitations. While the experimental design was tested in some early pilot tests and 
subsequently refined and improved several times, a number of potential design limitations became only apparent 
after data collection had been under way or completed.  The following are the most critical ones. (1) Level of time 
pressure was held constant across all treatments. Manipulating time pressure could yield additional insights on the 
 
 
effects of competitive arousal (2) The bidding mechanism that was implemented (bid changes in one dollar 
increments only) may have complicated price negotiation among buyers in case where the valuation spreads were 
high. (3) A small, linear time cost was incurred to buyers and sellers in each round that may have had an effect on 
some bidding decisions. (4) Participants were compensated with course credit, which may not have been 
sufficient to induce economic behavior in every case. (5) The experiment only implemented one specific type of 
(buyer-initiated) group-buying model, which limits generalization beyond this particular model.  (6) It is unclear 
how robust our results are with respect to changes in the pre-assigned demand schedules (product valuations) for 
the buyers. (7) We did not analyze seller data in the present study. Finally, (8), as with all experimental work, we 
need to be cautious to generalize the results from a single study done in a simplified laboratory setting to the 
much richer and more complex real world setting (of electronic group buying markets). 
Our study contributes a novel approach of employing methods from experimental economics for the purpose of 
designing and evaluation electronic market mechanism and platform designs and applied it to an example case 
from electronic commerce, using a bidding mechanism in an electronic group buying setting as a specific 
example. The study also offers an elaboration on Ku et al.‘s (2005) competitive arousal model for decision 
making. We offer two novel features, the setting of a group-decision making problem the addition of 
communication level as an antecedent. The present research adds to our understanding of group decision-making 
under pressure by considering the mitigating effects of offering communication capabilities on decision outcomes. 
Finally, the study has also some practical implications for designers of group buying platforms and operators of 
group buying sites. Our findings suggest that introducing competition among buyers and offering communication 
tools that support group coordination can help speeding up inventory turnover and also help to protect profit 
margins for sellers. We also suggest that group size matters and needs to be determined carefully, depending on 
the levels of competition and communication support. 
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